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Courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR),1 established 
under the Basic Law of the HKSAR,2 face a number of unique challenges that 
stem from the nature of the Basic Law, a national law of the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) constituting the HKSAR.3 Like the two-faced Roman god Janus, 
the Basic Law has a duality in that it is law both in the jurisdiction that establishes 
it (China) and in the jurisdiction it establishes (Hong Kong).4 Because of this 
dual operability, it can be dif!cult to achieve common understanding in the two 
Chapter 1
Concerns and Organization
1 The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was established, as of 1 July 1997, by the 
Decision of the National People’s Congress on the Establishment of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region (adopted at the Third Session of the Seventh National 
People’s Congress on 4 April 1990) (see 29 ILM 1549 (1990)) in accordance with 
Article 31 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. This article empowers 
the state to establish special administrative regions when necessary, with the systems to 
be instituted therein to be prescribed by law enacted by the National People’s Congress 
(NPC) in the light of speci!c conditions.
2 ie the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s 
Republic of China (adopted at the Third Session of the Seventh National People’s 
Congress on 4 April 1990; promulgated by Order No 26 of the President of the 
People’s Republic of China on 4 April 1990), 29 ILM 1511–1548 (1990). Excerpts of 
the provisions of the Basic Law discussed in this book are collected in an appendix at 
the end of the book.
3 The NPC adopted at the time of its enactment of the Basic Law the Decision of the 
National People’s Congress on the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region of the People’s Republic of China (adopted at the Third Session of the Seventh 
National People’s Congress on 4 April 1990) (see 29 ILM 1549 (1990)), which, upon 
making reference to Article 31 of the PRC Constitution, held that the Basic Law ‘is con-
stitutional as it is enacted in accordance with the Constitution of the People’s Republic 
of China and in the light of the speci!c conditions of Hong Kong’ and added that ‘The 
systems, policies and laws to be instituted after the establishment of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region shall be based on the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region.’
4 Daniel Fung used the expression ‘double life’ to describe the duality; see Daniel Fung, 
‘The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s 
Republic of China: Problems of Interpretation’ (1988) 37 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 701–714 at 706.
4 The Judicial Construction of Hong Kong’s Basic Law
jurisdictions, where the practitioners of law and politics differ in the way they 
understand and do things.
The challenges are concerned with adaptation.
Hong Kong received a common law legal system when it became a British 
colony in 1843. When Britain and the PRC negotiated the future of Hong Kong 
over a century later, one of the major issues discussed was the continuation 
of the pre-existing legal system. In the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the 
Question of Hong Kong 1984,5 the Government of the PRC declared that it 
would resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong on 1 July 1997 and 
that it would then apply to Hong Kong certain basic policies.6 These basic policies 
included the establishment of the HKSAR; the vesting of the HKSAR with execu-
tive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of !nal adjudica-
tion; and the provision that the laws currently in force in Hong Kong would 
remain basically unchanged.7 These and other basic policies were intended to 
remain unchanged for !fty years and were later stipulated as part of the Basic 
Law,8 which became effective on 1 July 1997.
The Basic Law established the legal and judicial systems of the HKSAR. Under 
the Basic Law, the HKSAR is vested with independent judicial power, includ-
ing that of !nal adjudication. The HKSAR courts exercise the judicial power 
of the HKSAR and adjudicate cases in accordance with the laws applicable in 
the HKSAR, which are the Basic Law, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong 
(which include the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legisla-
tion and customary law), the laws enacted by the legislature of the HKSAR, and 
national laws listed in Annex III of the Basic Law. The power of !nal adjudica-
tion is vested in the Court of Final Appeal, which may as required invite judges 
from other common law jurisdictions to sit on the Court. The HKSAR courts are 
authorized by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
(NPCSC) to interpret on their own, in adjudicating cases, the provisions of the 
Basic Law that are within the limits of the autonomy of the HKSAR. The HKSAR 
courts may refer to precedents of other common law jurisdictions. The HKSAR 
courts shall exercise judicial power independently, free from any interference.9
Judges and lawyers in Hong Kong, who have been trained in the common 
law, !nd themselves operating in a legal system still based in the common law. 
However, the HKSAR legal system is very much embedded within the legal system 
of Mainland China. The Mainland’s legal system is based essentially on demo-
cratic centralism, socialist legality,10 and the Stalin Constitution,11 but seems to 
be gradually re-adopting or re-connecting with the civil law tradition; it is a legal 
5 ie Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Question of Hong Kong (19/12/1984), 1399 UNTS 33, 23 ILM 1366–1381 (1984).
6 ibid, paragraphs 1, 3.
7 ibid, paragraph 3(1), (3), with elaboration in ibid, Annex, sections I, II.
8 ibid, paragraph 3(12).
9 Basic Law, Articles 2, 8, 18, 19, 80–93, 158.
10 See Georg Brunner, ‘The Functions of Communist Constitutions: An Analysis of Recent 
Constitutional Developments’ (1977) 3 Review of Socialist Law 121–153; and Yash Ghai, 
‘Constitutions and Governance in Africa: A Prolegomenon’, in Sammy Adelman and 
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system of its own Chinese characteristics. The present common law legal system 
of the HKSAR is a new order, constituted and maintained by the Mainland legal 
system through a number of channels. But those who emphasize the HKSAR’s 
‘seamless transition’ with a high degree of autonomy do not usually mention 
this fact.12
Concurrently, while the common law legal system continues, its dynamics 
have changed. The Basic Law is a written instrument constituting the systems of 
the HKSAR, establishing separately distinct governmental institutions to exercise 
speci!ed governmental powers and functions,13 and authorizing the HKSAR 
courts to interpret its provisions. The courts are empowered to make and !ll a 
special role in the exercise of judicial power, namely the constitutional jurisdic-
tion over executive decision making and legislative law making. This jurisdiction 
is comprehensive and coextensive with the broad coverage of the Basic Law. The 
exercise of this jurisdiction brings unfamiliar questions and public controversies 
before the HKSAR courts. It also raises expectations, often illusive, on the part 
of the public about the competence of the HKSAR courts to hold the execu-
tive and legislative branches accountable. Moreover, this jurisdiction entails 
agenda setting and lobbying by political minorities through litigation strategies. 
Mainland Chinese legal scholars have contested the legality and legitimacy of 
this jurisdiction, both at the time of its inception and thereafter. Such objec-
tions have been sustained and unabated for over a decade and may have gained 
intensity recently. The courts of the Macao Special Administrative Region, 
which adjudicate cases under a similarly worded Basic Law of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region but following a different legal tradition, behave differ-
ently from the HKSAR courts. This difference may serve to fuel distrust, discon-
tent or disapproval of the HKSAR courts’ authority to exercise its ‘constitutional 
role under the Basic Law of acting as a constitutional check on the executive and 
legislative branches of government to ensure that they act in accordance with 
the Basic Law’, and to determine ‘questions of inconsistency and invalidity when 
they arise’.14
 Abdul Paliwala (eds), Law and Crisis in the Third World (London: Hans Zell Publishers, 
1993) pp 51–75, at pp 56–60.
11 See Sophia Woodman, ‘Legislative Interpretation by China’s National People’s 
Congress Standing Committee: A Power with Roots in the Stalinist Conception of 
Law’ (Chapter 11), in Hualing Fu, Lison Harris, and Simon Young (eds), Interpreting 
Hong Kong’s Basic Law: The Struggle for Coherence (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) pp 229–241.
12 See HKSAR v Ma Wai Kwan David & Ors [1997] 2 HKC 315, [1997] HKLRD 761, CA; 
Solicitor (24/07) v Law Society of Hong Kong (2008) 11 HKCFAR 117, CFA; RV v Director of 
Immigration & Anor [2008] 4 HKLRD 529, CFI. On the other hand, Chan CJHC (now 
Chan PJ) did note, with considerable foresight, in Ma Wai Kwan David (above) a poten-
tial tension inherent in the Basic Law by reason of it being an instrument drafted by 
individuals practising in the Mainland legal system for a special administrative region, 
whose continuing legal system was rooted in the common law legal system.
13 Basic Law, Article 2 and Chapter IV, with section 1 (The Chief Executive), section 2 
(The Executive Authorities), section 3 (The Legislature), section 4 (The Judiciary).
14 As the Court of Final Appeal stated in Ng Ka Ling & Ors v Director of Immigration (1999) 
2 HKCFAR 4 at 25F–26G of the ‘constitutional jurisdiction’ of the HKSAR courts.
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This book will examine the exercise of independent judicial power under the 
Basic Law by the HKSAR courts. It will address three concerns:
r UIF SJTF PG UIF KVEJDJBSZ BT BO JOTUJUVUJPO PG HPWFSONFOU JO UIF ),4"3
particularly through the acquisition of the constitutional jurisdiction and 
the competence of the Court of Final Appeal to police its power of !nal 
adjudication;
r UIF MFHBM BOE QPMJUJDBM DPOTUSBJOUT PG KVEJDJBM QPXFS BOE UIF FYQSFTT BOE
implied limitations to its exercise; and
r UIFSFMBUJPOTUIF),4"3DPVSUTIBWFUPNBJOUBJOXJUIPUIFS JOTUJUVUJPOTPG
government within the HKSAR, and with the Central Authorities, in response 
to the various forces (including the public and civil society) that seek to in#u-
ence the exercise of judicial power.
The exercise of independent judicial power in the HKSAR necessarily involves 
negotiating along two sets of different, interlinked and interacting relation-
ships: the intra-SAR institutional relationships and the Central-SAR relationship. 
The individual perception and agenda of the institutions at the ends of each 
of these relationships create tensions. In resolving such tensions, the outer 
limits of the autonomy of the HKSAR and its ‘high degree’ are being charted 
and fathomed. And where the HKSAR courts are steering the course, they will 
from time to time sail between the Scylla of ‘one country’ and the Charybdis of 
‘two systems’, practising imperfectly the founding principle of ‘one country, two 
systems’ prescribed by the Central Authorities for the HKSAR.
The author’s career and experiences as a practising barrister (which includes 
several appearances before the Court of Final Appeal)15 and as council member of 
the Hong Kong Bar Association representing the Bar Association in public affairs 
forums (which includes attending consultation sessions of the Government and 
the Legislative Council [LegCo] of the HKSAR)16 have combined to produce 
an outlook that, in addition to the theoretical and doctrinal appreciation of the 
subject matter by virtue of one’s learning, involves the practical and tactical at 
the coalface of litigation. Thus, this study of the exercise of independent judicial 
power by the HKSAR courts, particularly the Court of Final Appeal, acknowledges 
the realities of constitutional adjudication. While questions of legality ought to 
be approached in a principled manner in accordance with a true understanding 
of the law, adjudication admits the self-conscious making of choices for conse-
quential, prudential, pragmatic or strategic reasons.
15 The author has been in private practice as a barrister in Hong Kong since 1993. He 
has appeared before the Court of Final Appeal in HKSAR v Ng Kung Siu & Anor (1999) 
2 HKCFAR 442, CFA; Lau Cheong & Anor v HKSAR (2002) 5 HKCFAR 415, CFA; Medical 
Council of Hong Kong v Helen Chan (2010) 13 HKCFAR 248, CFA; and Vallejos & Anor v 
Commissioner of Registration [2013] 4 HKC 239, CFA.
16 The author has been a member of the Council of the Hong Kong Bar Association 
between 1995 and 1997, 2001 and 2005, and 2006 and 2012, and in 2013. He has served 
as the chairman of the Bar Association’s special committee on constitutional affairs and 
human rights since 2008.
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This book is organized into six parts. Part 1 introduces the concerns and scope 
of study of the book and sets the context of the analysis that follows by discussing 
the provisions of the Basic Law and the underlying but competing and contested 
principles of ‘one country, two systems’, ‘high degree of autonomy’, ‘executive-
led government’ and ‘separation of powers’.
Part 2 traces the development of the constitutional jurisprudence of the 
HKSAR courts from the point of inception in 1997 to the recent turning points 
in early 2013. Cases across this sixteen-year time span are discussed in chrono-
logically arranged chapters, each seeking to highlight the particular resonance 
the adjudications have with current events. The constant and continuing theme 
underlying the cases examined—of individuals seeking judicial review of admin-
istrative and legislative decision making—is highlighted as a matter of historical 
fact with a view to detailed elucidation in the parts that follow.
Part 3 considers the independent judicial power, including the power of 
!nal adjudication, granted to the HKSAR courts and looks at how the Court of 
Final Appeal has, in a succession of judgments, asserted jurisdiction to review 
all decision making for conformity with the Basic Law. The normative value 
of the supremacy of the Basic Law is thereby turned into the practical power 
of supremacy of the HKSAR courts. Although the assertion of ‘constitutional 
jurisdiction’ in Ng Ka Ling & Ors v Director of Immigration17 was not a complete 
success,18 the comparatively muted reaction of the co-ordinate institutions of the 
HKSAR and their subsequent acquiescence, co-operation and even collaboration 
have allowed further elaboration of the judicial power of the HKSAR courts. This 
elucidation of judicial power has included pronouncing on invalidity under the 
previous legal order,19 declaring on questions of constitutionality in the absence 
or on the assumption of decision-making,20 and discovering the subset of implied 
judicial power with respect to remedies.21 The Court of Final Appeal has even 
successfully claimed kompetenz-kompetenz22 to police against ‘disproportionate’ 
17 Ng Ka Ling & Ors v Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4, CFA.
18 See Ng Ka Ling & Ors v Director of Immigration (No 2) (1999) 2 HKCFAR 141, where the 
Court of Final Appeal, in the light of the reaction of Mainland legal scholarship to its 
assertion of constitutional jurisdiction to examine whether legislative acts of the NPC 
or the NPCSC are inconsistent with the Basic Law and to declare them unconstitutional 
to the extent of any inconsistency, issued a judgment to clarify that it could not ‘question 
the authority of the Standing Committee to make an interpretation under Article 158 of 
the Basic Law’ and could not ‘question the authority of the National People’s Congress 
or the Standing Committee to do any act which is in accordance with the provisions of 
the Basic Law and the procedures therein’ (142D–E).
19 See Solicitor v Law Society of Hong Kong (Secretary for Justice, intervener) (2003) 6 HKCFAR 
570, CFA; and HKSAR v Lam Kwong Wai & Anor (2006) 9 HKCFAR 574, CFA.
20 See Leung TC William Roy v Secretary for Justice [2005] 3 HKC 77, [2005] 3 HKLRD 657, 
CFI (af!rmed on appeal in Leung v Secretary for Justice [2006] 4 HKLRD 211, CA).
21 See HKSAR v Lam Kwong Wai & Anor (2006) 9 HKCFAR 574, CFA.
22 The concept of kompetenz-kompetenz was used by the German Federal Constitutional 
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) to describe the determination of whether a judicial 
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encroachment of its power of !nal adjudication.23 Justi!cations for these expan-
sive moves, largely based on the ‘common law context’24 and the Hong Kong legal 
tradition are examined against several factors. First, the theoretical or doctrinal 
possibilities of political and constitutional systems are analysed. Second, compar-
ison is made to the practices of the courts of the Macao Special Administrative 
Region, which operate under a legal system in the continental civil law tradition 
on the basis of a similarly worded constitutional instrument, the Basic Law of 
the Macao Special Administrative Region.25 Finally, Mainland Chinese scholar-
ship is considered, especially the recent surge of comments concomitant with 
the increasingly attentive, if not interventionist, policy of the Central Authorities 
towards the HKSAR and its autonomous institutions,26 disputing the legality 
and the legitimacy of judicial review of legislation in Hong Kong.
Part 4 addresses the intra-SAR relationships the HKSAR courts have with other 
institutions of government under the Basic Law. This part begins with a look 
at the record of institutional compliance with judicial declarations of invalidity, 
an exercise that underscores both the claim of the futility and illusiveness of 
duty of the HKSAR of enforcing the Basic Law and the necessity of co-operation 
of the executive and legislative institutions in making judicial enforcement a 
reality. A subtle mutual co-operation, co-ordination and regulation between the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government must exist for effec-
tive governance, though not necessarily in the sense promoted by the Central 
 authority has ‘jurisdiction to give a binding ruling on the extent of one’s jurisdiction’, 
so that if it could make a binding decision (that no one else can legitimately challenge) 
on whether it has the authority to make a binding decision on a question before it, 
then it would be said to have kompetenz-kompetenz: Trevor Hartley, Constitutional Problems 
of the European Union (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 1999) pp 152–153. 
This concept has also been applied in the context of international tribunals (where it 
has usually been described as compétence de la compétence); see Abdul Koroma, ‘Assertion 
of Jurisdiction by the International Court of Justice’ in Patrick Capps, Malcolm Evans, 
and Stratos Konstadinidis (eds), Asserting Jurisdiction: International and European Legal 
Perspectives (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2003) pp 189–198 at p 192 and 
also in the context of arbitral tribunals (see Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v 
Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan [2011] 1 AC 763, UKSC). See also 
PY Lo, ‘Master of One’s Own Court’ (2004) 34 Hong Kong Law Journal 47–65.
23 Solicitor v Law Society of Hong Kong (Secretary for Justice, intervener) (2003) 6 HKCFAR 570, 
CFA; and Mok Charles Peter v Tam Wai Ho & Anor (Secretary for Justice, intervener) (2010) 
13 HKCFAR 762, CFA.
24 See Anthony Mason, ‘The Role of the Common Law in Hong Kong’, in Jessica Young 
and Rebecca Lee (eds), The Common Law Lecture Series 2005 (Hong Kong: Faculty of Law, 
University of Hong Kong, 2006) pp 3, 5, 7.
25 For an unof!cial English translation of the Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative 
Region of the People’s Republic of China (adopted at the First Session of the Eighth 
National People’s Congress on 31 March 1993; promulgated by Order No 3 of the 
President of the People’s Republic of China on 31 March 1993), see http://bo.io.gov.
mo/bo/i/1999/leibasica/index_uk.asp.
26 See Cheng Jie, ‘The Story of a New Policy’, Hong Kong Journal (July 2009) at: http://
www.hkjournal.org/archive/2009_fall/1.htm (last visited on 28 March 2011).
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Authorities in the case of the Macao Special Administrative Region.27 The courts’ 
understanding of the burden accompanying a successfully asserted ‘constitu-
tional jurisdiction’ is discussed in relation to the recognition and incorporation 
into the adjudicatory process of various limitations and reservations over the 
exercise of the power to declare a constitutional invalidity. There are four such 
approaches and each occupies a chapter:
r 5IFàSTUJTUIFDPOUJOVJOHBOEJODSFBTJOHSFMFWBODFPGUIFSFMBUFEEPDUSJOFT
of justiciability and the political question.28 The continuing relevance of 
the common law doctrine of justiciability to a legal system that adopts con-
stitutionalism or fundamental/human rights adjudication is questioned. 
However, certain provisions of the Basic Law that reserve competences in 
the speci!c subject matters of foreign affairs and defence to the Central 
Authorities29 may have transformational implications; that is, turning the 
doctrine of justiciability into a necessary implication upon the true extent 
of the constitutional jurisdiction of the HKSAR courts. Similarly, by inquir-
ing into the constitutional rationales for having a political question doctrine, 
the relevance of elements of that doctrine to the structure and institutional 
scheme envisaged under the Basic Law is pursued with a view to propose the 
incorporation of some but not all of such elements as a logical interpretive 
incident of the constitutional jurisdiction of the HKSAR courts.
r 5IFTFDPOESFMBUFTUPUIFVTFTQVUCFGPSFUIF),4"3DPVSUTPGUIFMBOHVBHF
of deference in a number of rulings on the constitutional validity of legisla-
tion,30 which include fundamental or human rights adjudications31 as well 
27 See Ji Pengfei, ‘Explanations on “The Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative 
Region of the People’s Republic of China (Draft)” and Its Related Documents 
(Addressing the First Session of the Eighth National People’s Congress on 20 March 
1993)’ (1993) Gazette of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 229–235.
28 For earlier discussions, see Albert Chen, ‘The Concept of Justiciability and the 
Jurisdiction of the Hong Kong Courts’ (1997) 27 Hong Kong Law Journal 387–390; Benny 
Tai, ‘The Jurisdiction of the Courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’, 
in Alice Lee (ed), Law Lectures for Practitioners 1998 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Law 
Journal, 1998) pp 65–117; Po-jen Yap, ‘Interpreting the Basic Law and the Adjudication 
of Politically Sensitive Questions’ (2007) 6 Chinese Journal of International Law 543–564.
29 Basic Law, Articles 13, 14, 19. See further FG Hemisphere Associates LLC v Democratic 
Republic of the Congo & Ors [2010] 2 HKC 487, [2010] 2 HKLRD 66, CA; Democratic 
Republic of the Congo & Ors v FG Hemisphere Associates LLC [2011] 5 HKC 151, CFA; C & 
Ors v Director of Immigration & Ors [2013] 4 HKC 563, CFA.
30 For recent discussions, see Cora Chan, ‘Judicial Deference at Work: Some Re#ections 
on Chan Kin Sum and Kong Yun Ming’ (2010) 40 Hong Kong Law Journal 1–14; and 
Cora Chan, ‘Deference and the Separation of Powers: An Assessment of the Court’s 
Constitutional and Institutional Competences’ (2011) 41 Hong Kong Law Journal 7–25.
31 Illustrative examples include HKSAR v Ng Kung Siu & Anor (1999) 2 HKCFAR 442, 
CFA; Lau Cheong & Anor v HKSAR (2002) 5 HKCFAR 415, CFA; Leung TC William Roy v 
Secretary for Justice [2005] 3 HKC 77, [2005] 3 HKLRD 657, CFI (af!rmed on appeal 
in Leung v Secretary for Justice [2006] 4 HKLRD 211, CA); Dr Kwok Hay Kwong v Medical 
Council of Hong Kong [2008] 1 HKC 338, [2008] 3 HKLRD 524, CA; and Fok Chun Wa & 
Anor v Hospital Authority & Anor [2012] 2 HKC 413, CFA.
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as judicial scrutiny of legislative restrictions of the courts’ powers,32 provid-
ing justi!cations (if any) for the HKSAR courts to accept, defer or give due 
weight to legislative, and sometimes, executive, judgment while exercising 
their jurisdiction under the Basic Law.
r 5IF UIJSE UBLFT PO UIF EFWFMPQNFOU BOE UBDUJDBM EFQMPZNFOU PG DPOTUJUV-
tional remedies and remedial techniques in several adjudications,33 whereby 
the plea of individual rights has led not to the protection of those rights 
but the pursuance of public or assumed common interests deemed more 
worthy of protection.
r 5IF GPVSUI JOWPMWFT BEKVTUNFOUT BOE FYQPTJUJPO PG UIF DPVSUT PXOQSPDF-
dural powers to facilitate the !ltering away or deterring of controversies from 
the courts’ door.34
Part 5 of this book deals with the Central-SAR relationship regarding the 
HKSAR courts, with attention paid principally to the interpretation of the 
Basic Law. Two provisions of the Basic Law appear to restrain the exercise of 
independent judicial power of the HKSAR in express terms. Article 19 of the 
Basic Law declares that the HKSAR courts ‘shall have no jurisdiction over acts of 
state such as defence and foreign affairs’, which the HKSAR courts have inter-
preted to bear upon the Central-SAR relationship.35 Article 158 of the Basic Law 
provides for the power of interpretation of the Basic Law and its distribution 
between the NPCSC and the Court of Final Appeal, incorporating a mechanism 
of reference by the Court of Final Appeal of a provision of the Basic Law to 
the NPCSC for interpretation, thereby seeking to maintain uniformity or consist-
ency in the interpretation of certain categories of provisions of the Basic Law.36 
32 Illustrative examples include A Solicitor v Law Society of Hong Kong (Secretary for Justice, 
intervener) (2003) 6 HKCFAR 570, CFA; and Mok Charles Peter v Tam Wai Ho & Anor 
(Secretary for Justice, intervener) (2010) 13 HKCFAR 762, CFA.
33 See Leung Kwok Hung & Ors v HKSAR (2005) 8 HKCFAR 229, CFA; Koo Sze Yiu & Anor 
v Chief Executive of the HKSAR (2006) 9 HKCFAR 441, CFA. See also Chan Kin Sum & 
Ors v Secretary for Justice & Anor [2008] 6 HKC 486, [2009] 2 HKLRD 166, CFI; and 
Koon Wing Yee & Anor v Insider Dealing Tribunal & Anor (2008) 11 HKCFAR 170, CFA. 
For a general view, see Kevin Zervos, ‘Constitutional Remedies under the Basic Law’ 
(2010) 40 Hong Kong Law Journal 687–718.
34 See Chan Po Fun Peter v Cheung CW Winnie & Anor [2007] 5 HKC 145, (2007) 10 HKCFAR 
676, CFA; Chu Hoi Dick & Anor v Secretary for Home Affairs (No 2) [2007] 4 HKC 428, 
CFI; and Re Leung Kwok Hung & Anor (unreported, 28 September 2012, HCAL 83, 
84/2012), CFI. See generally, Karen Kong, ‘Public Interest Litigation in Hong Kong: 
A New Hope for Social Transformation?’ (2009) 28 Civil Justice Quarterly 327–343.
35 The author once made an attempt to interpret Article 19 of the Basic Law in a judicial 
capacity; see HKSAR v Xiang Jiangjun & Ors (unreported, 13 November 2000, WSCC 
8109, 8110/2000), Deputy Magistrate Lo Pui-yin. The most authoritative attempt to 
interpret this article is that of the Court of Final Appeal in Democratic Republic of the 
Congo & Ors v FG Hemisphere Associates LLC [2011] 5 HKC 151. For an earlier exposition, 
see Benny Tai, ‘The Jurisdiction of the Courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region’, in Alice Lee (ed), Law Lectures for Practitioners 1998 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
Law Journal, 1998) pp 65–117.
36 For wide-ranging discussion of issues relating to Article 158 of the Basic Law and its inter-
pretation, see Johannes Chan, Hualing Fu and Yash Ghai (eds), Hong Kong’s Constitutional 
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Interpretation by the HKSAR courts of these two provisions of the Basic Law 
involves the determination by the courts of their competence. In highlighting 
the Court of Final Appeal’s track record in interpreting Articles 19 and 158 of the 
Basic Law and in declining to refer a provision of the Basic Law for interpreta-
tion by the NPCSC under Article 158 of the Basic Law, two prevalent perceptions 
in Hong Kong are revealed. First, there is a deep-rooted common law lawyer’s 
misgiving about the constitutional arrangement divorcing !nal interpretation of 
the provisions of the Basic Law from !nal adjudication applying those provisions 
and vesting the power of !nal interpretation with the permanent body of the 
NPC, the highest organ of state power which legislates the Basic Law. Second, 
the Court of Final Appeal is deeply concerned about conceding autonomy to 
the Central Authorities. The Court of Final Appeal’s ‘second-best’ approach of 
putting barricades at the gateway in an effort to limit the effect of measures from 
the Mainland system is contrasted with the preliminary reference mechanism of 
the European Court of Justice under the Treaty of the European Union, which 
was applied by that court to facilitate European integration. The interaction of 
the Court of Final Appeal with the Chief Executive’s acquired competing power 
of making a report to the Central People’s Government (CPG) as a preliminary 
move towards interpretation of the Basic Law is considered in terms of ‘system 
effect’. Alternative approaches, such as the doctrines of acte clair and acte éclair 
and the strategy of engagement, are also discussed with a view to formulate and 
appreciate strategic behaviour on the part of the HKSAR courts, particularly the 
Court of Final Appeal, in resolving the national law element with respect to these 
provisions vital to the exercise of judicial power of the HKSAR.
Another dimension of the Central-SAR relationship lies in the interpretation 
of national laws made applicable to the HKSAR, as listed in Annex III of the Basic 
Law, where, it seems, there is no mechanism in place to ensure consistent and 
uniform interpretation. This is a matter of some importance, given the subject 
matter of these national laws, namely defence, foreign affairs and other matters 
outside the limits of autonomy of the HKSAR, as speci!ed by the Basic Law.
The Central Authorities and the HKSAR courts appear to have achieved some 
ground rules of long-term bene!t to the rule of law, to which the principle of 
subsidiarity might apply. The ‘Congo’ case, which the Court of Final Appeal 
decided between June and September 2011 with an interpretation of the NPCSC 
in between,37 probably heralded, not unavoidably,38 an additional dimension 
 Debate: Con"icts over Interpretation (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000); 
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of overt interaction between the Central Authorities and the Court of Final 
Appeal, though it remains to be seen whether, as practised, this additional, direct 
approach will become the dominant discourse. The Foreign Domestic Helper 
cases, which the Court of Final Appeal decided in March 2013, may on the other 
hand have delayed the undermining of the ground rules hitherto understood 
merely by one case.39
There exists a theoretical possibility of the HKSAR courts’ serving as the last 
bastion defending against the amending erosion of the founding basic policies 
of the HKSAR. The building of this last redoubt may require the judicial elucida-
tion and expansion of the principles and objectives underlying the separate and 
autonomous systems of the HKSAR for the purpose of safeguarding them. These 
are posited at the end.
The concluding Part 6 of this book highlights the ‘second founding’ of the 
systems of the HKSAR by the HKSAR courts through their construction of the 
Basic Law, and questions the institutional agenda of the courts as promoters of 
the HKSAR’s autonomy, in the way they exhibit a cosmopolitan jurisprudence 
connected with the advanced common law and Western jurisdictions. Will the 
‘second founding’ be followed by the ‘second resumption of the exercise of sov-
ereignty’? By reference to cases discussed in previous chapters, the question is 
asked: Is Ng Ka Ling & Ors v Director of Immigration40 being diluted, if not stealthily 
overruled? Accompanying this warning are cautious notes against the undermin-
ing of the avowed common law approach of interpreting the Basic Law.41 The 
HKSAR courts are indeed at a crossroads.
The !ndings of the study are presented here to guide readers through this 
book.
The HKSAR courts have exercised independent judicial power—including 
the power of !nal adjudication, as well as the power of interpretation of the Basic 
Law, both authorized to them under the Basic Law—to construct the Basic Law. 
The HKSAR courts do so notwithstanding that the Basic Law is a legal instru-
ment drafted by a committee dominated by Mainland Chinese legal scholars of 
the socialist legal order and adopted as a national law to implement the basic 
policies of the PRC regarding Hong Kong. The HKSAR courts do so to fashion 
the Basic Law into a written constitutional instrument of binding force within 
the HKSAR’s common law based legal system, with the courts assuming the role 
of a constitutional check on the other institutions of government of the HKSAR, 
including the executive authorities and the legislature, to ensure that they act in 
accordance with the Basic Law. The HKSAR courts give effect to such binding 
force by construing the Basic Law and determining questions of inconsistency and 
invalidity of legislation or executive decisions. This role is known as the ‘consti-
tutional jurisdiction’.
The constitutional jurisdiction is judicially constructed; it is a role that the 
Court of Final Appeal has created and !lled for the HKSAR courts. In the course 
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of time, constitutional adjudication conducted by the HKSAR courts, as shown in 
the discussion in Chapters 21 and 22, has resulted in the accretion, if not accu-
mulation, of powers and competences of the courts over decision making by the 
executive authorities and the legislature of the HKSAR. These robust achieve-
ments have carried with them responsibilities and consequences that the HKSAR 
courts, particularly the Court of Final Appeal, must bear and manage.
The constitutional jurisdiction is vulnerable. It is under-theorized and has 
been challenged in Mainland legal scholarship. The constitutional jurisdiction, it 
can be said, continues at the sufferance of the pragmatic approach of the Central 
Authorities and the recognition and support of the HKSAR executive authorities 
for the vital role the HKSAR courts play in the maintenance of the rule of law in 
the international !nancial centre of Hong Kong. The HKSAR courts, as part of 
the political system of the HKSAR, are concerned with the ‘effective governance’ 
of the region, suggesting that a subtle sense of ‘comity’ or mutual understanding 
in this regard exists between the governmental institutions of the region. Part 4 
shows the ways in which the HKSAR courts have tended to ‘second guess’ the 
political departments in constitutional adjudication, at the phases of interpreta-
tion of provisions of the Basic Law, determination of consistency with the Basic 
Law, and the according of remedies consequential to a determination of incon-
sistency with the Basic Law. As Chapter 23 shows, in response to the phenom-
enon of individuals and groups seeking judicial remedies for political and social 
causes, the HKSAR courts have also tightened the procedural requirements for 
judicial review, illustrating how seriously the judges have taken the potential of 
politicization of constitutional adjudication.
This judicial sensitivity has been more pronounced in the manner in which 
the Court of Final Appeal has responded to requests for making references of 
provisions of the Basic Law for interpretation by the NPCSC. This is illustrated in 
Part 5. The Court of Final Appeal has adopted or may adopt various strategies in 
response to these requests but the core value it has steadfastly sought to preserve 
is the judicial autonomy that is part of the HKSAR’s high degree of autonomy. 
This can alternatively be put as a preference for subsidiarity in the judicial dispo-
sition of cases, that is, in favour of the lower institutional level as much as and as 
far as possible. The Court of Final Appeal has done this to stay out of the ‘game’ 
of reference under Article 158 of the Basic Law. Once the Court of Final Appeal 
has decided to enter this ‘game’, the self-restraint of the Central Authorities in 
accordance with this principle of subsidiary will have to be nurtured and main-
tained, with the Court applying an appropriate strategy of engagement.
Can this ‘second founding’ of the Basic Law by the HKSAR courts be sus-
tained? The Ng Ka Ling principles that founded the constitutional jurisdiction in 
obligatory terms may have weathered in the light of the adjustments discussed 
in Parts 4 and 5 after years of constitutional adjudication. Chapter 32 examines 
both the risks of Mainland Chinese in#uences that the application of indigenous 
resources in jurisprudence—such as the use of historical materials associated 
with the drafting of the Basic Law, the stress of original intent and the reliance of 
the meaning of the authentic Chinese text—pose to the vitality of constitutional 
adjudication in Hong Kong, as well as the theoretical hope for the HKSAR courts 
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to actively engage Mainland Chinese in#uences and interventions by recogniz-
ing and developing constitutional principles and values of the HKSAR system, to 
establish the HKSAR’s autochthonous constitutional identity as a common law 
based legal system within the PRC.
There is another corrosive and perhaps more disturbing force. Litigants inside, 
and election-minded politicians outside, the courtroom, demand the revision or 
recanting of established decisions on matters of constitutional interpretation, 
either on the pretext of ‘changed’ socioeconomic circumstances or, worse, upon 
the premise, by reference to sparsely reasoned Mainland legisprudence, that the 
courts had been wrong in the !rst place. These demands may be summed up as 
popular, or people’s constitutionalism. The potential of executive and legislative 
interventions in senior judicial appointments has been raised. The best defences 
are always vulnerable from within.
The HKSAR’s constitutional identity must remain internationalist, con-
necting through the open door of Article 84 of the Basic Law with common 
law jurisdictions of the outside world. Cosmopolitanism, even in a half-baked 
form, is a better way for the Hong Kong Judiciary to address and handle evolving 
demands and challenges of the modern society and the international !nancial, 
trading and shipping centre of Hong Kong than non-progressive indigenization 
of jurisprudence.
In addressing internal demands for accountability, the Judiciary may point out 
that reasoned judgments—the product of an open and public process of adju-
dication, where the relevant evidence and arguments are carefully examined on 
their legal merits, underlying values and practical implications—are the primary 
form of accountability. It is a matter for the Judiciary as a whole to consider 
acknowledging openly that constitutional interpretation and adjudication 
intrude into government policy and involve the courts partaking a role with the 
political branches of government in the governance of Hong Kong. However, 
judges must necessarily, for their own sake, understand thoroughly the consider-
ations of the policy and decision-makers, as opposed to working on assumptions 
and educated guesses. The con!dence of the public in the judicial process and 
the rule of law is to be gained through explanation and example, illuminating 
what is at stake, and not following the crowd.
The chapters that follow present a study of the HKSAR courts through their 
interpretation of the Basic Law in the adjudication of cases. This book thus 
attempts to outline in the next two chapters the approach of the HKSAR courts 
to the Basic Law and the systems it stipulates, as well as to identify and clarify the 
concepts and ideas involved.
